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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court of Appeals of the State of Utah has
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to §78-2a-3 (2) (a) of
the Utah Code 19 53 as amended.
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a Summary Judgment
dismissing Plaintiff's claim that the Defendant, State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., was guilty of breach of
contract and breach of implied covenants of bad faith, fair
dealing, and fraud in the manner in which it dealt with
Plaintiff's claims under Plaintiff's policy of insurance
with State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
International Rehabilitation Associates, Inc., was dismissed
from the case by Judgment and Order dated April 4, 1989. (R.
202-204).

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., was

granted a Summary Judgment by Judge Michael Murphy on
December 7, 1989 (R.351).

Plaintiff appeals the decision

for Summary Judgment and asks this Court to reverse the
decision and remand the case back to the District Court for
a trial on the merits.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
The issues on appeal are the following:
1.

Whether there is a genuine issue of material
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fact regarding Defendant/Respondent's breach of duty to
Plaintiff/Appellant in the following particulars.
(a)

Whether the Plaintiff/Appellant, as a first

party insured, has a breach of contract claim against the
Defendant/Respondent.
(b)

Whether Plaintiff/Appellant has a cause of

action for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.
(c)

Whether there is a genuine issue of material

fact regarding Plaintiff's/Appellant's claim of fraud.
2.

That there exists a genuine issue of material

fact regarding Defendant's/Respondent's breach of duty to
Plaintiff/Appellant and Summary Judgment should be reversed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Plaintiff/Appellant, hereinafter referred to as
"Pixton" was insured by Defendant/Respondent State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., hereinafter referred to as
"State Farm" at the time she was involved in an accident,
under Policy No. 477-6467-44.
On March 12, 1984, Pixton was involved in an
automobile accident when an unattended runaway vehicle,
owned by Robert J. Davies struck the automobile which Pixton
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was driving.
(R. 2-3)

Mr. Davies was also insured by State Farm.

As a result of the accident Pixton sustained

injuries and needed medical treatment.

On or about July 5,

1984, State Farm's agent, Felix Jensen, contracted
International Rehabilitation Associates, hereinafter
referred to as IRA to assist him in evaluating Pixton1s
claim.

(R.3-4) Pixton believed the nurse/employees of IRA

were in fact hired to assist her in physical recovery and
rehabilitation.

(R.56)

During this time of recovery Pixton was paid PIP
benefits under her insurance policy.

Pixton was tendered a

settlement of $2,500.00 May 30, 1985 on the basis of Mr.
Jensen's evaluation of her condition.
(R. 5) After this offer, on November 14, 1986
Pixton made a formal demand to State Farm to provide her
with the amount of medical expenses incurred by State Farm,
including the amount paid to I.R.A for medical and nursing
services.
(R.71)

The latter request was denied by State Farm.

State Farm claimed that monies paid to IRA were for

non-testimonial experts and were file expenses, claiming
them to be non-medical expenses.

Pixton made more demands

to State Farm by herself and through her attorney, which
were refused.

Pixton rejected State Farm's $2,500.00 offer to

settle her claim.

State Farm made no counter offers of
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settlement prior to Pixton filing a complaint on March 4,
1987 against State Farm and IRA.

Previous to this time

she was not going to retain an attorney or file a
lawsuit.(R.56)

On April 4, 1989 a Summary Judgment was

entered for IRA dismissing them as a Defendant.
Pixton, on May 12, 1989, amended the complaint in
this case alleging breach of contract, breach of implied
covenants of good faith, fair dealing and an action in
fraud.

As no progress was being made to settle this matter,

Pixton was placed in a position of having to go forward and filed
another lawsuit against Robert J. Davies and Carl Hothan,
in Case No. (87-7987) for injuries sustained from the accident
March 12, 1984.
It was not until the day of trial, May 9, 1989,
five years after the incident occurred, that State Farm
extended an offer of $7,500.00 to Pixton to settle the case.
Pixton did not feel this was fair, but due to State Farm's
delay, and their refusal to give her any information as to
money paid to IRA, she accepted the offer.

Pixton, due to

force of economic circumstances, personal problems and
advice of counsel, felt compelled to accept the offer.

The

settlement was entered June 13, 1989.

Settlement was based

on admitted medicals of only $871.51.

See District Court
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file (87-7987).

The claims against State Farm were not

dismissed.
State Farm filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in
the instant case.

The Court granted State Farm's Motion

December 7, 1989 finding no conflict of interest between
State Farm's adjuster, waiver of rights to IRA information,
no breach of contract or implied covenants of good faith or
fair dealing or fraud.

(R.351)

Pixton appeals that ruling.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Pixton contends the Motion for Summary Judgment
should not have been granted in favor of State Farm.

That

there are genuine issues of material facts presented in the
pleadings, affidavits, memorandums and arguments on file
concerning her claims of breach of the insurance contract,
breach of implied covenants to deal fairly and in good faith
with her in settling her claim and fraud.
State Farm did not deal fairly and in good faith
by delaying settlement for 5 years when it had all information
required to settle within the first year.

State Farm withheld

medical expenses information from Pixton, thus reducing her
recovery.

That the Trial Court did not take into account Pixton1s

affidavit or the one of Mr. Milton Beck in making its decision.
Pixton contends that the totality of State Farm's actions
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and attitudes toward settlement perpetuated a fraud on her
causing aggravation and mental distress.

Pixton contends

that a jury could find breach of contract and bad faith
dealing by the insurer if issues were submitted to them.

To

allow the Summary Judgment to stand effectively denies
Pixton a hearing on the merits, on the issue of fact as to
whether State Farm acted in good faith in dealing with the
insured-Pixton.

There are abundant allegations in the

record showing genuine issues of fact to reverse and remand
this case for further hearings and a jury trial.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THAT INSURER BREACHED ITS CONTRACT AND IMPLIED
COVENANT OF FAIR DEALING, AND GOOD FAITH TOWARDS
THE INSURED UNDER ITS INSURANCE CONTRACT
It is a well settled point of law that an
insurance company has, besides its basic contractual duty,
an obligation to deal in good faith and fairly with its
insured.
This implied-in-law duty of good faith and fair
dealing is imposed in most jurisdictions.

Crisici v.

Security Insurance Co., 66 CAL 2d 425, 426 P2D 173 (1967);
4 0ALR 2d 168 (1955)
Westchester Fire Co.

Corwin Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v.
279 N.W. 2d 638 (1979) (N.D. 1979);
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Timmons v. Royal Globe Insurance Co., 653 P2d 907 (Okla.
1982) .
A major decision that all insurance contracts,
first party as wrell as third party, contain an implied duty
of good faith and fair dealing was announced in Gruenberg v.
Aetna Insurance Company, 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P2d 1032.

The

court stated:
"The duty to act is imminent in the
contract whether the company is attending to> the claims of third persons
against the insured or the claims of the
insured itself." 510 P2d at 1038.
In Rawlings v. Apodacca 776 P2d 565, 569 (Arizona
1986) held., "that the law implies a covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in every contract."

See Restatement

(second edition) of Contracts §205 (1981); Williston on
contract §670 at P159.
In regards to this duty the Utah Supreme Court has
stated:
"with respect to making and accepting
proposals of settlement to protect its
insured, we believe the best view is that
it must act in good faith and be zealous
in protecting the interest of its insured
as it will in looking after its own" emphasis
added Ammerman v. Farmers Insurance Exchange,
19 Utah 2d 261, 430 P2d 576 (1967)
More recently the Utah Supreme Court held
"... that the good faith duty to bargain
or settle under an insurance contract
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is only one aspect of the good faith and
fair dealing implied in all contracts and a
violation of that duty gives rise to a
claim for breach of contract. In addition
. . . . held that the refusal to bargain and
settle, standing alone, may, under
appropriate circumstances be sufficient
to prove a breach." Beck v. Farmers
Insurance Exchange, 701 P2d 795 (1985).
The Court further stated in Beck v. Farmers
supra,
... we conclude that the implied obligation
of good faith performance contemplates, at
the very least, that the insurer will
diligently investigate the facts...
will fairly evaluate the claim, and
will thereafter act promptly and
reasonably in rejecting or settling
the claim. See Anderson v. Continental
Insurance Co., 85 Wise 2d at 692-93 271 N.W.
2d at 377; Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance
24 Cal 3D 809, 818-819, 598 P2d 452,
456-457 (1979) The duty of good faith
also requires the insurer to "deal with
laymen as laymen and not as experts in
the subtleties of the law and under
writing" and to refrain from actions
that well injured the insured's ability
to obtain the contract. MFA Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Flint, 574 S.W. 2d at 720,
quoting Merchants Indemnity Corp. v.
Eggeleston 37 N.J. 144, 122, 179 A.2d
505, 509 (1962); accord Bowler v. Fidelity
& Casualty Co., 53 N.J. 313, 327, 250 A2d
580, 587 (1969)
The Supreme Court amplified the principal that
insurer has breached its duty it is liable for
suffered by that breach.
It is Pixton's contention that State Farm breached
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its duties to her, by not settling promptly and fairly and
not giving her the information needed to gain a fair
settlement from State Farm.

That State Farm, did not deal

with Pixton as a "layman" but expected her to act as an
expert in the subtleties of law and underwriting.

This was

accomplished by State Farm's classifying the amounts paid
IRA as expenses and not medicals.

Pixton clearly thought

she was receiving medical benefits from IRA (R 56 and at
287) .
The basic reason for allowing an action for bad
faith and unfair dealing is due to the imbalance of
bargaining power between the insurer and insured.

The

insured needs some leverage to take away the advantage the
insurer has and give him an effective remedy against the
insurer that acts in bad faith.

Beck v. Farmers Exchange

supra.
Pixton has been harmed by the actions of State
Farm and she believes that if the question were presented
to a jury it could and would find that State Farm acted in
bad faith in that they violated a fiduciary relationship
they had established with Pixton through its employees and
its position of economic strength and power.

See Dependable

Life Insurance Co. v. Harris, 510 502d 985 (Fla. Dist. Ct.).
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Now, the fact established by the many cases that
a duty exists the question is did State Farm as the insurer
breach its duty and obligation to Pixton?

This question

Pixton contends gives rise to a question that a jury must
decide.
The facts point to State Farm's breach of duty in
several areas.

State Farm, knowing that there was complete

liability for which they had to pay, shortly after the
accident did not effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable
settlement.
The first thing State Farm did was to have its
agent, Felix Jensen, bring in the IRA nurses and employees,
not as an organization to help Pixton recover and
rehabilitate her, but to find a means to keep their monetary
liability down.

This was not a responsible action to Pixton

but a means of cutting their (insurers) losses.

Pixton

believed IRA employees were there to help her in recovery
and rehabilitation not to be working for the insurance
company to mitigate their loss.

(R 56 & 287).

When State Farm made an offer it was only for
$2,500.00.

(R 5)

At the time of the offer the claims

supervisor for State Farm, Samatha Bird, recognized that the
claim of Pixton was worth $7,500.00.
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(R 236-238)

State

Farm proffered the $7,500.00 amount on May 9, 1989, the day
of the trial 5 years later.

(See Civil Case 87-7987).

This

was not a prompt and fair handling of the claim by State
Farm and a jury could so find.
Further, by insurance terminology medical expenses
in this case became file expenses.

Thus, the refusal of

State Farm to release these expenses paid to IRA, until the
date of trial in Civil Case No. 877987, left Pixton in a
position of not being fully knowledgeable of the full amount
she could recover under standard insurance settlement
practices.

State Farm was not dealing fairly or in good

faith with Pixton, they were protecting their own pocket
book.

This action decimated Pixton causing her great

aggravation and emotional distress.

These are damages that

Pixton should be allowed to recover and a trial should be
held on the issue.

See Hayseeds Inc. v. State Farm Fire &

Casualty 352 SE2d 73 (W.Va 1986)
Insurance Co. 426 P2d 178:

Crisici v. Security

It has been held breach of

contract includes mental and emotional distress.

See

Gruenberg v. Aetna Life Insurance Co. 9 Cal 3d 566 510 P2d
1032 (1973).

Beck v. Farmer, supra.

Pixton also contends that a jury could find bad
faith and unfair dealing, in that the adjuster for State
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Farm, Felix Jensen, was the adjuster on both the first party
claim and the third party claim of Pixton.

This can only be

an open conflict of interest hindering Pixton's ultimate
chance of a fair settlement.

It is Pixton's contention that

Mr. Jensen had access to both files which contained
information about Pixton's claim.

A position which put

Pixton at a disadvantage when it came time for settlement.
A prudent and fair approach would have been for State Farm
to have two separate adjusters in this matter as the insured
must have protection and all negotiations must be above
board.
The record contains an affidavit of Milton Q.
Beck, licensed public insurance adjuster of 15 years
experience, qualified to testify as an expert witness in
insurance bad faith cases.

Mr. Beck examined all the

documents available and in his expert opinion stated there
is "substantial evidence of insurer's (State Farm) failure
to satisfy its legal duties of good faith and fair dealing
in the adjustment of insured's (Pixton) loss.
Mr. Beck's opinion was also that State Farm
breached its duties by failing to have two insurance
adjusters to handle the separate claims and failing to
disclose the amount of expenses paid to IRA by State Farm.
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That State Farm's non-disclosure of IRA payment caused
Pixton to receive less for her claim.

If known the

reasonable sett ament wou . be between $9,000.00 to
$11,000.00
kind.

using the standard for settling claims of this

(R90-93)

It was his opinion that these actions

constituted bad faith.
The Utah Supreme Court in Beck, Supra accepted
Beck's argument that the affidavits as submitted by Beck and
the Plaintiff were sufficient to create a genuine issue of
fact as to whether Defendant, Farmer's breached the implied
covenants of good faith and fair dealing.

In American

Concept Insurance Co. v. Lochhead, 751 P2d 271 (Utah Ct App
1988) in a bad faith case, this court held an expert may
state his opinion on the ultimate issues when it is based on
the type of information usually relied on by experts in his
field and allowed the affidavit of an expert to be used.
Pixton asks this court to follow the principal set
forth by the Supreme Court and rule that there is a genuine
issue of material fact to be decided by a jury.
POINT II
THAT THERE EXISTS A GENUINE ISSUE OF

MATERIAL FACTS REGARDING STATE FARM'S
BREACH OF DUTY TO THE INSURED THUS
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED
The Trial Court in granting State Farm's Motion
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for Summary Judgment believed there was no genuine issue of
facts that would warrant a trial in this matter (R. 351).
Judge Murphy ruled that he felt there was no conflict of
interest on Mr. Felix Jensen's part, being adjuster for both
Davies and Pixton; there was a waiver concerning the issue
whether or not the payments to IRA were medical expenses or
file expenses; the Beck affidavit was not material.
(Reporters transcript Nov. 20, 1989 P.33-34).
Summary Judgment is appropriate if pleadings and
all other submissions, including depositions, answers... and
affidavits show there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
(Utah 1980)

Hegler Ranch Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P2d 1390

The record and submissions are to be viewed in

a light favorable to the party opposing the motion.
the standard applied and universally followed.

This is

Jensen v.

Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 611 P2d 363 (Utah 1980)
Behlmager v. Carson, 603 P2d 790 (Utah 1979).
Pixton claims the court erred in its rulings and a
trial should examine the issues.

The Judge's ruling in this

case, that Beck's affidavit was not admissible because the
issues presented are different from those in Beck v.
Farmer's Exchange, is erroneous.
of bad faith by the insurer.
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The issue simply is that

The sworn affidavits in this case for Pixton,
especially that of Beck shows that there are material and
serious issues that should be tried.
As stated in Holbrook Company v. Adams, 542 P2d
191, 193 (1975), "it only takes one sworn statement under
oath to dispute the averments on the other side of the
controversy and create an issue of fact.11

In the instant

case there are sworn affidavits by Pixton and Mr. Beck, an
expert, refuting State Farm's claim they were not guilty of
bad faith in this matter.

How could the District Court

Judge refute or deny Beck's affidavit in this case when he
had not read it and State Farm had not moved to strike it or
filed a rebutting affidavit?

(Reporter's Transcript Nov.

20, 1989 P. 11 and 12.
Based on the American Concept Ins. Co, v.
Lochhead, case supra, Beck's affidavit would be sufficient
to oppose granting of a Summary Judgment.

His affidavit is

sufficient in that it sets forth facts that would be
admissible in evidence.

See Preston v. Lamb, 20 Utah 2d

260, 436 P2d 1021 (1968) Norton v. Blackham, 669 P2d 857;
Rainford v. Rytting 22 Utah 2d 252, 451, P2d 769.

The

affidavit also meets any further sufficiency requirement as
it was made on personal knowledge of Mr. Beck who is
competent to testify on the issues at trial.
Pixton also asserts that the Trial Court erred
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when ruling that she waived any right to access and usage of
the information concerning payments to IRA by State Farm.
While it is true that Summary Judgment may be granted based
on an affirmative defense, such as a valid release (waiver)
that would defeat the cause of action, Ulibarri v.
Christensen, 2 Utah 2nd 367, 275 P2d 170; in the instant
case this is not the fact.

State Farm did not plead waiver

or release as an affirmative defense, thus based on
procedural precepts the Summary Judgment as granted on that
ground should be reversed.

This is especially true, in

that, Pixton did move to have a decision on whether the IRA
payments by State Farm were to be classified a medical
expense or not (Reporters Transcript pg 9) and Judge
Frederick in Case No. 877987 refused to rule on the
motion.
Because a Summary Judgment is granted as a matter
of law rather than ruling on the facts this court is
allowed, as an appellate court, to reappraise the trial
courts legal conclusions.

See Barber v. Farmers Insurance

Exchange, 751 P2d 248 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)

Pixton thus asks

this Court to look at the facts and the record and
reevaluate them.

Upon such reappraisal of the facts the

court should reverse the Summary Judgment.

The court will

become aware of the presence of many disputes as to material
facts which will disallow the granting of a Summary
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Judgment.

Bill Brown Realty, Inc. v. Abbott, 562 P2d 238

(Utah 1974) .
Pixton believes that reasonable minds could differ
as to the conduct of State Farm in handling her claim and
whether their conduct of not dealing with her in good faith
constituted bad faith and did not measure up to the required
standard in the insurance business.
645 P2d 613 (Utah 1982).

See Jackson v. Dabney,

Further, that she needed to only

show contraverting facts to have the case sent to trial.
This Pixton did and the Summary Judgment should be reversed.
Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors Inc., 761 P2d 4 2
Ct 1988 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)

Ruffinengo v. Miller, 579 P2d

342 (Utah 1978).
Because Summary Judgment is such a harsh remedy
and prevents litigants from fully presenting their case the
courts have held that the granting of such remedy should be
done reluctantly and only when there is no clear issues to
be resolved at trial.

In Re Williams Estate, 348 P2d 348;

Brandt v. Sprinqville Banking Co., 10 Utah 2d 350; 353 P2d
460 (1960).
Pixton asks this court to follow the true and
correct theory in this case that she is entitled to have all
the facts presented, inferences fairly arising therefrom be
considered in a light most favorable to her and be resolved
in her favor, as the party opposing the motion.

17

See Young

v. Texas Co., 8 Utah 2d 206 331 P2d 1099 (1958)

Thompson v.

Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d 30, 395 P2d 62 (1964)

English v.

Kienke 774 P2d 1154 (Utah Ct. App 1989) Bowen v. Riverton
City 65 P2d 434 (Utah 1982), Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson
Brick Co., 780 P2d 827 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the
Summary Judgment granted to State Farm, should be reversed
and the case be remanded for trial on the clearly disputed
issue of fact and merits.
CONCLUSION
That based on the law and facts presented, the
ruling granting Summary Judgment should be reversed and the
matter remanded to the trial court with instructions to have
the matter tried on its merits, consequential damages,
attorney's fees, costs and whatever further relief deemed
appropriate under the circumstances.
Respectfully submitted this
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